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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                         
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
     Defendant-appellant Kevin Fowler appeals from an order of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denying 
his petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.  2255.  We 
are asked to determine if the United States Parole Commission has 
the authority to impose a new term of special parole under 21 
U.S.C.  841(c) following revocation of his original special parole 
term.  We conclude that the Parole Commission does maintain 
jurisdiction over Fowler under  841(c), but that the non- 
incarcerative sanction that it can impose is not special parole, 
but traditional parole.  To the extent that the Parole Commission's 
regulations at 28 C.F.R.  2.52(b) and 2.57(c) allow a contrary 
result, we hold that they are inconsistent with  841(c).  
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the district court and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
      
                                I. 
     The facts of this case are not in dispute.  On April 21, 1986, 
defendant-appellant Kevin Fowler was sentenced by the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York to a two-year 
term of imprisonment for distributing narcotics within 1000 feet of 
a school.  The two-year sentence was to be followed by a six-year 
term of special parole pursuant to 21 U.S.C.  841(c).  Fowler was 
subsequently released from incarceration and began serving his 
special parole term on May 19, 1990.   
     On April 23, 1992, the Parole Commission revoked Fowler's 
special parole based upon his use of drugs, failure to report to 
his probation officer, and violation of a special drug aftercare 
condition.  The Commission ordered that he receive no credit for 
time spent on special parole, and that he serve twelve months prior 
to reparole.  The Commission later rescinded this requirement, and 
instead required service of an additional three months because 
appellant had escaped from a halfway house.   
     Fowler was once again released from incarceration and placed 
on special parole on February 17, 1993.  He was to remain under 
supervision until November 3, 1997.  However, on November 16, 1993, 
the Commission again revoked Fowler's special parole because of 
continuing drug use, another violation of the drug aftercare 
condition, and criminal possession of a controlled substance.  The 
Commission ordered that Fowler receive no credit for any of the 
time he had spent on special parole and that he be reparoled after 
serving thirty-two months in prison.  The decision was affirmed by 
the National Appeals Board.  
     On November 2, 1994, Fowler filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the District of New Jersey.  He argued that the 
Parole Commission had no statutory authority under 21 U.S.C.  
841(c) to impose a second or third term of special parole after it 
had revoked the initial term in April 1992.  Appellant's Brief at 
4.  On March 17, 1995, the district court ruled that the Commission 
retained jurisdiction over Fowler after its initial revocation of 
special parole, and denied Fowler's petition.  This appeal 
followed. 
     We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  2255 and 1291.  
Our standard of review is de novo.  See e.g., United States v. 
Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 309-10 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The decision whether 
to grant or deny a habeas corpus petition is reviewed de novo.").  
 
                               II. 
     21 U.S.C.  841(c) provides: 
     A special parole term . . . may be revoked if 
     its terms and conditions are violated. In such 
     circumstances the original term of imprisonment 
     shall be increased by the period of the special 
     parole term and the resulting new term of 
     imprisonment shall not be diminished by the time 
     which was spent on special parole.  A person whose 
     special parole term has been revoked may be 
     required to serve all or part of the remainder of  
     the new term of imprisonment.  A special parole 
     term provided for in this section shall be in  
     addition to, and not in lieu of, any other parole 
     provided for by law. 
 
21 U.S.C.  841(c) (repealed).   
     The Courts of Appeals that have interpreted this statute have 
disagreed about its meaning.  In Evans v. United States Parole 
Commission, 78 F.3d 262 (7th Cir. 1996) and Artuso v. Hall, 74 F.3d 
68 (5th Cir. 1996), the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Fifth 
Circuits concluded that the Parole Commission has no authority to 
reimpose special parole after revoking a parolee's initial term.  
In United States Parole Commission v. Williams, 54 F.3d 820 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) and Billis v. United States, 83 F.3d 209 (8th Cir. 
1996), the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the 
Eighth Circuits reached the opposite conclusion.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we agree with, and are guided by the reasoning of 
Evans.  We need not reiterate at length why the analysis in 
Williams and its progeny is flawed.  Rather, we find the analysis 
in Evans, and its criticism of Williams, to be persuasive.  See 
Evans, 78 F.3d at 265-66.  
     In concluding that successive terms of special parole would be 
impermissible under  841(c), Evans and Artuso rely persuasively on 
a line of cases interpreting a similar provision governing 
supervised release, 18 U.S.C.  3583(e)(3).  See Evans, 78 F.3d at 
264; Artuso, 74 F.3d at 71.   
     Subsection 3583(e)(3) authorized a court to "revoke a term of 
supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all 
or part of the term of supervised release . . . without credit for 
time previously served on postrelease supervision." 18 U.S.C.  
3583(e)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV).  In United States v. Holmes, 954 
F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the 
word "revoke" in  3583 meant to "cancel or rescind," and therefore 
provided courts with no authority to impose a second period of 
supervised release after revoking the first term.  In United States 
v. Malesic, 18 F.3d 205, 206-207 (3d Cir. 1994), we agreed with the 
reasoning set forth in Holmes.  In Malesic, this Court stated that 
"revoke generally means to . . . rescind."  Malesic, 18 F.3d at 206 
(citing, Holmes, 954 F.2d at 272).  Once a term of supervised 
release has been "revoked" under 18 U.S.C.  3583(e)(3), we 
concluded that an additional term could not be imposed "given the 
conspicuous absence of a statutory provision clearly permitting a 
court to do so."  Id. at 208.  Several other Courts of Appeals 
similarly interpreted the language of section 3583(e)(3), and 
reached the same conclusion as to its effect.  See United States v. 
Koehler, 973 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Cooper, 962 
F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Truss, 4 F.3d 437 (6th 
Cir. 1993); United States v. McGee, 981 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Rockwell, 984 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir.), cert. denied __ U.S. 
__, 113 S.Ct. 2945, 124 L.Ed.2d 693 (1993); United States v. Tatum, 
998 F.2d 893 (11th Cir. 1993); but see United States v. O'Neil, 11 
F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Schrader, 973 F.2d 623 
(8th Cir. 1992).         
     Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not 
explicitly rely on the word "revoke" in its analysis of  
3583(e)(3), the Behnezhad court employed essentially the same 
reasoning as Holmes and Malesic.  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reasoned as follows: 
     The government argues that it would be logical 
     for a court to be able to revoke a term of 
     supervised release, impose a term of incarceration 
     and then impose another term of supervised release. 
     . . . However, Congress has enacted an unambiguous 
     statute that does not provide courts with that 
     option.  We would exceed our authority were we to 
     judicially rewrite that legislation. 
 
Behnezhad, 907 F.2d at 899.  We believe the language of 21 U.S.C. 
 841(c) requires a similar result. 
     In the instant dispute, both Fowler and the Parole Commission 
assume that our inquiry is bipolar.  That is to say, they suggest 
that if 21 U.S.C.  841(c) does not authorize the imposition of a 
new term of special parole, the Commission loses jurisdiction over 
the parolee when the original term of special parole is revoked.  
However, we do not believe that our analysis is so constrained.   
     The interpretation of any statute obviously begins with an 
analysis of the text itself. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 
(1986) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of 
a statute is the language itself.").  Thus, when Fowler's original 
term of special parole was revoked, the statute dictated that the 
     original term of imprisonment shall be 
     increased by the period of the special parole 
     term and the resulting new term of 
     imprisonment shall not be diminished by the 
     time which was spent on special parole. . . . 
     A person whose special parole term has  
     been revoked may be required to serve all 
     or part of the remainder of the new term 
     of imprisonment. 
 
21 U.S.C.  841(c).  Upon revocation, Congress has specifically 
required a "new" term of imprisonment equal to the full term of 
special parole.  However, after resentencing, Congress has 
expressly granted the Parole Commission authority to release a 
special parole violator.  The statute plainly states that a 
violator such as Fowler "may be required to serve all or part of . 
. . the new term of imprisonment."  Id.  Consequently, if a 
sentencing court imposes a three year term of imprisonment, the 
Commission may require that only two be spent in prison.  The 
Commission obviously does not lose control or jurisdiction over the 
offender after the two years served behind bars.  
     In Williams, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that  841(c) "mandates 
a new prison term equal to the term of special parole . . . the 
only open issue is whether the parolee must serve all of that term 
behind bars, or may serve the term through a combination of 
incarceration and special parole."  Williams, 54 F.3d at 824.  As 
the Seventh Circuit observed in Evans, we believe that Williams 
advances a "false dichotomy."  Evans, 78 F.3d at 265.  Upon 
revocation,  841(c) clearly provides for the re-release of a 
special parole violator and permits him or her to serve a sentence 
of imprisonment on the street.  The only unresolved question, in 
our estimation, is the nature of that release.  In answering that 
question, it is helpful to consider the development of parole and 
the differences between the parole that has been traditionally used 
as a sanction, and the special parole that is involved in this 
appeal.  
     The first use of traditional parole in the United States came 
in 1876 with the opening of the New York State Reformatory for 
Juveniles in Elmira.  See Neil P. Cohen & James J. Gobert, The Law 
of Probation and Parole,  1.05 (1983 & Supp. 1993).  The founders 
of Elmira adopted a system of indeterminate sentences which, as its 
final stage, provided for the conditional supervised release of 
inmates.  Id.  Since that time, the practice of releasing 
prisoners, on the condition that they abide by certain rules during 
the balance of their sentences, "has become an integral part of the 
penological system."  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 
(1972).  While on traditional parole, the "prisoner" is deemed to 
be continuing to serve the original sentence imposed by the trial 
court and remains in legal custody until that sentence expires even 
though the offender is "at liberty" and not incarcerated behind 
bars.  If the parolee violates a condition of release, he or she 
may be returned to prison for the unexpired term of imprisonment. 
In such a case, the "unexpired" term would be the original term of 
imprisonment reduced by time served and the time the defendant 
spent on the street before the violation.  The credit for "street 
time" is the natural consequence of the concept that a parolee 
serves his or her time "on the street."  See Evans, 78 F.3d at 263.  
Thus, traditional parole is merely "a conditional release from 
incarceration . . . prior to the expiration of the full term set by 
the sentencing court."  Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 116 n.10 
(3d Cir. 1995) (citing Roberts v. United States, 491 F.2d 1236, 
1238 (3d Cir. 1974)).  It is a part of a sentence of imprisonment, 
and has historically been a mechanism whereby one could be released 
yet continue to serve the sentence -- so long as the parolee 
complied with those rules of society that were a condition of 
parole.  See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477.     
     In stark contrast, special parole is a statutory creation 
imposed in addition to any term of years.  It is applied to 
offenders by a sentencing court only pursuant to a specific grant 
of authority from Congress.  See Parry, 64 F.3d at 116-117; 
Roberts, 491 F.2d at 1237-1238.  As the court noted in Evans: 
           
          Three things are 'special' about special 
          parole: first, special parole follows the term 
          of imprisonment, while regular parole entails 
          release before the end of the term; second 
          special parole was imposed and its length 
          selected, by the district judge rather than by 
          the Parole Commission; third, when special 
          parole is revoked, its full length becomes a 
          term of imprisonment. In other words 'street 
          time' does not count toward completion of 
          special parole . . . .  This third difference 
          is a consequence of 21 U.S.C. (1982 ed.)  
          841(c) . . . . 
78 F.3d at 263.  See also Bell v. United States, 521 F.2d 713, 715 
(4th Cir. 1975) ("The mandatory special parole term imposed by the 
1970 Act is unique.  It is in addition to any other parole, 
remaining in effect after the original prison sentence has been 
served and the period of regular parole has expired . . . .  Since 
the statute prescribes no maximum special parole term, the 
additional prison sentence may be lengthy.") 
     Just as 18 U.S.C.  3583(e)(3) did not provide for the 
imposition of a post-revocation term of supervised release, section 
841(c) does not provide for a new term of special parole following 
revocation. Rather, the non-incarcerative custody authorized by  
841(c) is part of the sentence of imprisonment mandated upon the 
revocation of special parole; it is not in addition to it.  Thus, 
it is traditional parole.  Nowhere in  841(c) has Congress vested 
a district judge or the Parole Commission with the authority to 
reimpose a special parole term. 
     The Parole Commission downplays this clear absence of 
statutory authorization by arguing that "it has always been 
understood [under pre-Guidelines law] . . . that somebody who has 
had their special parole revoked, could be placed on another term 
of special parole." (Tr. at 21-22).  In support of this 
proposition, the government directs this Court to language in 
United States v. Gozlon-Peretz, 894 F.2d at 1402, 1405 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1990), aff'd, 498 U.S. 395, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991) 
and Williams.  In Gozlon-Peretz, we stated, in dicta, that "upon 
revocation of special parole, an individual may be re-paroled."  
Id. at 1405, n.5.  Similarly, in Williams, the court referred to  
          the common pre-Sentencing Guidelines 
          understanding  . . . that parole violators 
          could be reparoled pursuant to  841(c). This 
          much followed from the established pre- 
          Guidelines sentencing principle that 'parole 
          is available unless expressly precluded.' 
          (quoting United States v. Mudd, 817 F.2d 840, 
          843 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) 
           
54 F.3d at 825.  We agree.  However, the issue is not the 
availability of parole under  841(c), but the nature of the parole 
that is specifically contemplated by that statute. 
     Far from endorsing the reimposition of special parole, the 
statements from Gozlon-Peretz and Williams confirm our present 
understanding, that the parole that is imposed after special parole 
is revoked can only be traditional parole.  As we stated above,  
841(c) leaves no doubt that special parole violators are eligible 
for some period of release on their new term of imprisonment.  In 
the absence of statutory authority, however,  841(c) provides no 
basis for characterizing that period of release as special parole.  
To the contrary, because the statute allows violators to serve at 
least a portion of their time on the street, such release is 
identical to traditional parole.  Consequently, despite its 
asserted prevalence, any pre-guidelines approach condoning the 
post-revocation imposition of special parole, is without foundation 
in the controlling statute.  Although general acceptance of a 
practice must be considered in any reasoned analysis, a practice 
bottomed upon an erroneous interpretation of the law is not 
legitimized merely by repetition.  
     The Parole Commission further argues that its regulations are 
entitled to deference, and that those regulations authorize a new 
term of special parole following revocation of the initial term.  
28 C.F.R.  2.57(c) provides, in part: 
     Should a parolee violate conditions of release during the 
     Special Parole Term he will be subject to revocation on the 
     Special Parole Term . . . and subject to reparole or 
     mandatory release under the Special Parole Term. 
 
28 C.F.R.  2.52(b) states: 
 
     If parole is revoked . . . the Commission shall also 
     determine . . . whether reparole is warranted or whether 
     the prisoner should be continued for further review. 
     The Parole Commission promulgated these regulations pursuant 
to a specific grant of statutory authority.  We are, of course, 
mindful of the deference that is due the Parole Commission's 
interpretation of  841(c) and the regulations it has promulgated 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  4203.  See Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  We owe no deference, 
however, to administrative interpretations or regulations that are 
based upon an impermissible construction of the statute.  Id.; see 
also, Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994).  Indeed, 
such a regulation or interpretation is invalid. 
     Section 841(c) is not so ambiguous as to allow the 
interpretation urged upon us by the Government.  See BATF v. FLRA, 
464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) ("[Deference] cannot be allowed to slip into 
a judicial inertia . . .").  No statutory authority exists for a 
second term of special parole after the initial term has been 
revoked.  Rather, Congress has merely authorized a new term of 
imprisonment which can include noncustodial supervision. 
Therefore, early release from that term of incarceration is parole 
as that sanction has traditionally been used in criminal law.  
Moreover, in merely authorizing "reparole", the Commission's 
regulations are not to the contrary.  Those regulations do not 
suggest that any new term of parole should be characterized as 
special parole rather than traditional parole.  To the extent that 
the Parole Commission's regulations at 28 C.F.R.  2.52(b) and 
2.57(c) are interpreted to authorize the reimposition of special 
parole, they are in conflict with  841(c).  Where such a conflict 
exists "the regulations must, of course, give way."  McComb v. 
Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1991). 
     Finally, we note that Congress has amended the supervised 
release statute to grant sentencing courts explicit authority to 
impose post-revocation terms of supervised release.  See 18 U.S.C. 
 3583(h) (1994).  The Parole Commission suggests that  3583(h) 
must also reflect congressional intent with respect to the 
operation of special parole.  However, we must presume that "a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means . . . what it 
says."  Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 1146, 1149 
(1992).  Since section 841(c) provides no basis for reimposing 
special parole, we will not rely upon the amendment of  3583 to 
force a construction on section 841(c) that is contrary to the 
plain language of the statute. 
 
                               III. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the 
district court and remand the case to the district court with 
instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.  The 
district court will then remand to the Parole Commission for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  If the Parole 
Commission determines that Fowler's maximum period of supervision 
(with credit for any street time he may have earned following 
revocation of his term of special parole) has not expired, the 
Commission may determine if it wishes to impose any additional term 
of traditional parole.  In the event that the Commission determines 
that Fowler's maximum period of supervision has expired, or that it 
does not wish to impose any further traditional parole, Fowler must 
be released from custody.       
      
       
      
          
        
